Both sides recognized that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons made them military unusable, but they did serve diplomatic purposes. For instance, the flight of unarmed B-29 bombers to Europe during the Berlin Crisis demonstrated U.S. President Truman’s commitment to the defense of Western Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The most striking case was the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the threat of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) deployed to Cuba prompted the removal of similarly capable U.S. systems stationed in Turkey. Additionally, the lingering threat of a nuclear confrontation did not limit the superpowers’ actions in the Third World. Each engaged indirectly, through proxy involvement, or via direct participation in engagements ranging from the Arab-Israeli Conflict to the Korean and Vietnam …show more content…
In spite of the sense of security encouraged by the ownership of nuclear weapons, each nation also developed great insecurity, as the escalation of a simple conflict had the potential to result in a nuclear exchange that would destroy both. This sentiment served as the basis for the security paradox that emerged during this period and was one of the primary impulses igniting the arms race, as each power invested profoundly in the development of nuclear doctrine, delivery capabilities, and the number of warheads in order to gain at minimum, the slightest lead over the other. This condition emanated from the perceived imbalance of conventional military power subsequent to the demobilization of U.S. forces at the conclusion of World War II, which prompted U.S. President Eisenhower to restructure the nation’s military forces. Eisenhower believed that atomic weapons had made large land armies outdated. As such, he placed greater emphasis on the procurement and development of nuclear weaponry. The threat of massive retaliation was the central precept of this approach and likely prompted the Soviet Union to reconsider potential offensive actions directed on Western Europe, as they lacked the nuclear arsenal to counter a U.S. nuclear attack. Though the Soviet Union did not have a distinct doctrine for the employment