Atomic Bombing Ethical Analysis

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The justifications of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been continually debated from the time of occurrence. The variety of approaches towards the topic often times leads to ambiguous conclusions that leave debaters dumbfounded. Primarily, there are two moral reasonings that analysts of the event utilize: the utilitarian approach and ethical tradition. The utilitarian approach determines the goodness or evil of an action by its consequences (1). It has been said that this approach led the United States to reduce innocents to instruments and morality to arithmetic during World War II (1).
By contrast, ethical tradition rooting from Judeo-Christian theology holds that some actions cannot be justified by their consequences, rather
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The most blatant justification was that the bombs would save lives (1). The alternative option of invasion would have a death toll on both sides that would surely surpass that from Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1). Additionally, the fierce obstinacy of Japanese militarists led Truman and his advisors to believe nothing else would succeed in forcing them to surrender (1). Truman also wanted to justify the immense funds that went towards the Manhattan project (9).The immense power that the atomic bomb represented intimidated the Soviets at a time when the foreign relation between the United States and the Soviet Union was not exemplary (9). Along with a lack of incentives not to use the bombs, a major reason for using them was to respond to Pearl Harbor (9). Any speculation towards the morality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was cut off by Truman with his observation that “any schoolboy’s afterthought is worth more than all the generals’ …show more content…
The country made three fruitless attempts through neutral Sweden and Portugal to bring the war to a peaceful end in April and May of 1945 (6). American officials, having long since broken Japan’s secret codes, knew from the intercepted messages that some of the country’s leaders were seeking to end the war (6). By mid-June 1945, the Japanese Supreme War Council authorized an approach to the Soviet Union with a view of terminating the war if possible by September (3). In addition, the Secretary of Navy James Forrestal reported real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war by mid-July 1945 (3). The Potsdam Declaration (July 26, 1945) gave Japan a chance to surrender; Prime Minister Suzuki rejects it because Emperor Hirohito wanted the continuation of war until he was guaranteed that he would remain in power and not be tried as a war criminal (10). The plight of the Japanese citizens during war was not something he considered. Hirohito, however, becomes increasingly aware of the declining public support for the continuation of war (10). Despite the egocentric obstinacy of Hirohito, a secret memorandum was sent to Roosevelt showing an offer of surrender from the Japanese (6). Reporters were obliged to keep withhold the furtive story due to wartime conditions (6). Nevertheless, Hirohito and his advisors welcomed the atomic