David Lewis’ Argument against van Inwagen’s Incompatibilism In his essay, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” Lewis considers a dubious case of the ability to choose whether you raise your hand. In Lewis’ view, the claim: if it is predetermined that I will not raise my hand, and if, in fact, I raise my hand then, some law (of nature) is broken, “confers no marvelous ability to break a law, even though a law would be broken if I did it” (Lewis 125). What Lewis is disputing in this case is that, breaking a law (of nature) does not mean that a person had to be the cause of the breach of law, only that a “divergence miracle” is needed in order to do something such that if it were done, a law would be broken (Lewis 125). It is important to understand that “divergence miracle,” means a miniscule, localized, aberration in the law (of nature). In his book, Philosophical Papers Volume II, Lewis calls this type of miracle a “small” miracle, and uses this term in opposition to the term “big” or “convergent miracle,” which is the familiar way that “miracle” is inferred and demarcated (Lewis 55-6). The tactic that Lewis is employing in this argument is to grant a “weak thesis” conceding only, “I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law would be broken,” and that this is no more than a real consequence of…show more content… However, to claim that this “divergence miracle” is an effect afore the cause of me raising my hand is incongruous to the mode cause and effect is thought to operate viz., that cause is before the effect. By claiming that the cause is now raising my hand, is to claim that the effect is the preceding “divergent miracle”. Consequently, Lewis can concede that a law (of nature) could be broken, and at the same time reject that he is the responsible agent for that break in the law (of
