Functionalist's Type-Identity Theory

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Philosophy of mind studies mental phenomena and their relationships with the physical body, behaviors, and the brain. This branch of philosophy raises a compelling question if a person lacks an organic brain, but she is able to behave like a normal human, whether the patient has mental states or not? By endorsing Functionalism doctrine, I shall content that it is possible for the patient to have mental states without having a normal human brain. To start with, I will explain the positions of Doctor #2 and Doctor #3. Doctor #2 is a Type-Theorist. Type is a label given to describe a group of entities which all share certain attributes. For example, the smartphone is a type of phone which has a touchscreen. The Type-Identity theory postulates …show more content…
Pain is not the synonym of C-fiber firing. They are different concepts, but they refer to the same thing (3). By adopting Type Identity theory, Doctor #2 is inclined to claim that since mental states are identical to brain states, and the patient does not have any sort of normal human brain, therefore she does not have qualia and intentional states. Doctor 3 has taken on the position of Functionalism and Token Identity theory. Whereas Type Identity theory defines mental states by their relationships with brain states, Functionalism individuates mental states by their functions, what types of mental states is depend on what the states can do. Mental states play a casual role between certain input states (sensory states), output states (verbal …show more content…
His stance on Functionalism opposes to the view of Doctor #2, who is a Type – Identity theorist. Type-Identity theories conjectured mental states are type identical to brain state. It is impossible for mental states to be physically realized (3) It follows that other species use other kinds of brain do not have mental states. According to Hilary Putman, Type-Identity theory is implausible. He puts forward the famous multiply realizable argument in favor of rejecting Identity theory and promoting Functionalism. He argues that mental properties are not identical to physical properties because the same mental property can be related to different physical properties, and mental states are multiply realized. For example, considering the possibility as such of the mental states of extraterrestrial species. Perhaps aliens may have human- level intelligence or even they are more advanced than us. They evolved in a separate planet. Since alienation creatures use different structures other than the human brain to think such as their brain, but it is plausible to think that they do have mental states, therefore Type Identity must be false because that theory states that a particular mental state is identical to particular brain state. Accordingly, the multiple realization argument rejects Type – Identity theory because of its implausibility. On the other hand, multiple realization argument promotes Functionalism. Functionalism defines