How Did Spain Fight In The 16th Century

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Spanish warfare in the 16th Century saw steady growth in its military power. Spain was the dominant military power of 16th Century Europe, primarily because the troops were the only real regulars west of the Ottoman Empire, because they alone were permanently employed, since Spain was always at war. Spanish forces provided a proper career structure for officers, for the same reason. Spanish armies of the 16th Century acted as models and training schools for many other armies as well. The main force for home defense and the support of the Civil Power was the militia of the cities, the Hermanadad , which included both cavalry and infantry. It was reorganized into battalions of ten 50 man companies each, those having seven percent with firearms, …show more content…
Helmets were commonly of sallet type, which was favored in Spain at the time. Provincial militia served throughout the time period, mainly against rebellions. A standing army under stronger royal control was started in the later 1490s. The latter were infantry, formed in 100 man companies, and similar to the Hermanadad troops in appearance. One-third was pikemen, one-third swordsmen, and one-third crossbowmen and arquebusiers. A high proportion of this expeditionary force was crossbowmen as well, and there were still many swordsmen. The former were steadily replaced by arquebusiers. Infantry firepower was the first use of massed arquebusiers, and was the key to early Spanish success. The troops were divided into columns under "Coronels", at first of about 600 men in three squadrons. In 1505, twenty Colunelas, of one thousand to two thousand men each, in four or five "Banderas", were established. These were mostly of pikemen and arquebusiers, although included a few halberdiers, and up to about twenty percent of swordsmen. Showing in the early 1530s, these were a new step in infantry organization, for the Spanish or any other European army. They were the first large permanent infantry units, both tactically and