For the people of Rugton to successfully bring the case in front of the European court of justice (ECJ) they must firstly show that the European Union (EU) is an international system of law, thus being seen as a unique system of law formally known as 'suigerneris'. That this unique system in this case acts as a monist system, in which means that all states of the European Union are bound by EU law. Within the Treaty of Lisbon, declaration 17 we are told that ' Treaties and laws adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of member states' subsequently we are told further of EU supremacy In the case of Costa (1964) where we get the deceleration of supremacy, ' laws issued by European Institutions are to be integrated into the legal systems of member states who are obliged to comply with them'. Applying it to the matter here, although the airport is complying with UK law we must not forget that EU law would always be seen to be supreme as seen in Van Gend en Loos (1963). 'European law therefore has precedence over national laws no matter if there is resistance politically or any other means besides that of the EU itself'. No matter how small or big the difference is from the directive the people of Rugton shouldn’t incur a problem in their challenge in this particular part.
Following on with the EU we see the imposition of the European commission, the commission itself was set up by the court of justice, where the prime objective of the court is to be a watchdog over the member states of the EU. They look over that all member states are complying with EU laws and all EU directives, within article 288 we are given a definition of what a directive is, 'a legislature act of the European Union which requires member states to achieve a particular result without dictating the means of that result’.
However the directive is only made by the EU, through Rewe (1979) we are told that EU law does not provide remedies, the remedies itself are left to national courts to apply. Which leads on to the argument that the boundaries of these directives are seen to be unclear, the principles which are defined are more often or not seen to leave little or no discretion for the national courts, or the fact that it may be described so vaguely that it doesn’t provide the national court with any guidance. If there is a suspicion that there was a breach of a directive, the EU must be alerted through the preliminary reference procedure. The preliminary reference procedure was created through article 267, 'Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, require the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon’, the procedure itself being a way that an individual or a tribunal are able to communicate with the EU about the breach of the directive. The fact that the directive had been implemented upon the UK without conditions means the directive itself must be followed precisely. If the directive is not followed, like in the case at hand here, surely the country should be liable for the breach of the directive (Francovich 1990). However we are told the investment group Cul-De-Sac hold a majority share of the airport and at the meeting between the representative and the people of Rugton four points were mentioned which tried to justify their action. Firstly the fact that the company had tried to outline the fact that Rugton may not be seen as a residential area is a fault in itself. That part of the question should be put up through the preliminary reference procedure, where the ECJ will investigate the claim and then be able to give a conclusive answer. Although it may be seen that the airport is complying with UK law we must not forget that EU law would always be seen to be supreme (Costa 1964).
One mechanism which could be used in this circumstance is that of Alternative Dispute
