In What We Owe Each Other, William Scanlon explains how moral standards can differ in various ways. Scanlon defines moral relativism as a thesis that there is no single optimum standard for the moral appraisal of acts, but rather a variety of standards. Parametric universalistic hold views which allow for variations in what is right by applying a definite set of substantive moral principles to varying circumstances. Moral relativism can be deemed consistent when it assumes a single normative perspective from which verdicts can be made about which moral principles people in various situations have reason to regard as authoritative. Relativism can be seen as menacing by weakening the force of morality for keeping people in line, by compromising our confidence in our judgments that certain acts are infact wrong, and by subverting the importance of these judgments.
In addition to offering up relativism as a means of discrediting, some writers have become benign relativism, on which the demands of morality fluctuate but are not necessarily taken less seriously because of this change. In one instance of benign relativism, people have grounds to take a standard for face value if it is identified as having this status in their similar ways of…show more content… First, society sometimes needs some principle to govern activities, but there are several acceptable and nonrejectable principles to chose from. On the Principle of Established Practices, if one of several principles are generally accepted, then it is from that point on wrong to go against that principle. Second, under differing social provisions, people will possess contrasting generic reasons for refusing posed principles. There will be no need to draw more conventional inclusive principles to vouch for the accuracy of particular
