On War Strategy Analysis

Words: 1853
Pages: 8

American's national interests have remained constant throughout her short history and rise to prominence - peace, prosperity, and liberty. However, while America's national interests have remained constant, objectives have changed because our leader's challenges and opportunities have changed. In his early 19th century manuscript On War, Clausewitz posited that strategy and war was uncertain, unpredictable, and marked by chance. While sound and consistent political objectives marked by good decision making can make the execution of strategic objectives at all levels of war more achievable, it is impossible to eliminate uncertainty and friction because of countless unforeseeable and unaccountable variables. The more the scale moves from …show more content…
Clausewitz's observation was that, "the higher the rank, the more the problems multiply, reaching their highest point in the supreme commander. At this level, almost all solutions must be left to imaginative intellect." Essentially, it is very hard to train strategists and thus, very hard to make strategy. I would submit that the creation of strategy is influenced by these inevitable and intangible factors that contribute to strategic outcomes. Thus, America has neither always been bad at nor good at strategy; there instead exists both persistent weaknesses and enduring strengths in its strategy. In this paper I will expand on why strategy is so difficult, identify persistent weaknesses, and illuminate enduring strengths woven throughout the history of American …show more content…
Vietnam is a good example of where American strategy failed to incorporate diplomacy and information and Iraq is a perfect example of where American strategy disengaged entirely across all elements of DIME leading to the present day crisis with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Philippines War notwithstanding, Americans do not fair well in irregular warfare. Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan are examples of how insurgents have used time and attrition to erode America's political will. American policy makers have been unable to incorporate adaptive strategies in these complex, dynamic environments often rooted in culture and ideology. When Americans lack international and domestic support and has instead chosen to act without a United Nations (UN) mandate and/or the country has not mobilized for war, the outcomes have not met with positive results. The US acted without a UN mandate in both Vietnam and OIF, and to an extent, both wars lacked domestic support, Vietnam more so than OIF. While the US has historically reserved the right to act unilaterally, international support proffers legitimacy and availability to global resources. Finally, when American strategy uses the role of air power as a coercive instrument in isolation of other forms of military power, the results normally do not yield success. During