Terrorist organization Funding
From variations in size, from state like organizations such as ISIS, to smaller more decentralized self-directed networks, terrorist organizations mobilize through the means of gaining financial resources to advance their actions and operations. Terrorist organizations are under immense pressure to constantly keep their financial structure stable by raising funds through different means. This paper will focus on how terror organizations raise funds, and how counterterrorist measures are impacting the actions of terror organizations post 9/11. The mechanisms are being put in place to stop terror organizations, with practices such as reducing laundering money by implementing banking regulations, to reducing their control over major natural resources; governments hope to drastically reduce mobilization efforts. Using peer-reviewed sources of information, I will analyze if it is simply a waste of resources to try to affect an organization’s ability to mobilize by implementing measures to reduce financing? By looking at how governments like the US, and the power of groups like the UN have implemented rules and regulations on different groups that interact with terror organizations, we can see that they are not effective at dismantling and reducing organizations’ power. By looking at how terror organizations launder money, we can see how they use financial systems to help mobilize their organization and what is being done to reduce or dismantle such practices.
Another key aspect to the organizational infrastructure of terrorism is how the hierarchal structure can cause lower ranking members to skim funds during financial exchanges1. By looking at the multi-faceted system that provides organizations with necessary finances to increase recruiting and continue to achieve further operational goals. Due to the low earnings of organization members not ranking high, Shapiro looks at how the emerging pattern of money skimming takes place and how it affects the organizations ability to achieve its end goals. Middlemen as he points out are driven more by monetary reward than by actual mission accomplishment. What this means for greedy middlemen is that they end up keeping much of the funds that are allocated by higher ranking leaders designated for the operatives, reducing the number of successful attacks. If nations are going to capitalize on this specific vulnerability of a hierarchical organization, they must first determine who is playing the role of middlemen in these various organizations. In order to create friction within an organization, leaders sometimes spend on activities other than attacks, this is because of counterterrorism efforts ability to seize funds and place budgeting constraints on organizations. The author points out that there is a threshold that governments must reach when seizing funds in order to have any dramatic impact on the operational environment. When leaders have to rely less on ideologically committed individuals, it changes the internal dynamics of the organization as such that they have a harder time achieving their strategic goals.
Often we find that terrorist organizations seek funding from non-governmental organizations in the area they are operating out of4. Terror organizations understand the vulnerability of these organizations’ structure, and often seek to exploit them. NGO’s give their employees and volunteers ability to travel to different areas, which provides cover for terrorists, and groups knowing or unknowingly assist these terrorists by providing offices, contacts, and fundraising systems for the terrorist organizations. Specifically one of the sources analyzed will observe Hezbollah’s resourcing ability and how they generate funding for their operational costs.
Financial institutions rely on positive public reputation, and thus develop internal controls to prevent terrorists from laundering money which could damage