The bureaucratic system is a complicated one. It often involves heavy power struggles between Congress and the President where each party is attempting to exercise control and power. To judge presidential success, it depends on where and how the president’s power is derived. Authors Epstein and O’Halloran, Neustadt and Moe each have opposing theories regarding delegation between Congress and the President. These theories help explain the amount of authority delegated and the type of actors that receive discretionary authority. The theory authors Epstein and O’Halloran offer, can help explain how the system of delegation between Congress and the President is structured. Epstein and O’Halloran base the president’s power on the institutional…show more content… Neustadt claims that “the key to presidential success” is entirely dependent on his or her persuasion and bargaining ability. The President’s ability to influence legislators to vote in favor of expanding his authority relies on his bargaining power. Presidents must convince legislators that the White House’s interests are aligned with theirs and that voting to delegate greater power to him is in their best interest. Neustadt describes the bureaucratic design as a game where Congress and the President have to engage in a kind of “collective bargaining” where each party attempts to exert control over the other. This theory of Neustadt’s emphasizes that discretionary authority will “flow to presidents with strong negotiating skills and interpersonal abilities”. Presidents who are effective bargainers and who yield status and authority will have a much easier time gaining votes for delegation in their favor. This theory varies drastically from that proposed by Epstein and O’Halloran. It doesn’t consider any outside factors that might influence the delegation of power besides the President’s personal…show more content… This theory would propose - “presidents with greater bargaining skill would retain more direct control over delegated authority” meaning that they would have more say in what actors gain authority. Within the executive branch, the President’s power might be weak because agencies can act without being heavily influenced by the President. For instance, “the more an officeholder’s status and his powers stem from sources independent of the President, the stronger will be his potential pressure on the President”. These agencies may be able to receive greater discretionary authority because they have an equal or greater bargaining advantage over the President. The location of delegated authority is entirely up to the skill level of the President who “can retain more direct control over agencies exercising discretionary authority”. This theory is important because it suggests that a president’s success is determined from personal factors more or less within their control. However, this theory presents a concern – how legislation is entirely dependent on persuasive relationships. These relationships may be based off fear or personal interests rather than what is best for the
