The Study Of Area 51 Conspiraciess

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I-Search Paper By: Matthew Allen Hiner My topic is on Area 51 conspiracies. This is a picture of Area 51 also known as Groom Lake. The thing that I researched the most on area 51 was the OXCART Project. The OXCART program concept began in7reliminary design study effort involving Lockheed and Convair focusingollow-on toircraft. In9 this study phase was completedreliminary contract award to Lockheed. Inontract was awarded tohitney for the development of8 engine. In2 the first aircraft was rolled out and in2 the first flight was completed.light was attained in Inimited operational contingency capability at Machas established for overflight of Cuba. Much5 has been spent in aircraftwhich were based on lessons learned from flight test experience. Recent flight experience indicates substantial systems improvement and hasapability to repeatedly fly ator prolonged durations and at altitudes0 feet. With additional systems refinement and simulated mission demonstration now underway, an operational capability should be attained by December of this year. Read more: Hiding OXCART in Plain Sight Sketches YF-12AWhile the A-12 was being tested and refined, US officials mulled over two major issues concerning it. The first was whether to publicly disclose the OXCART program. The Department of Defense had grown concerned that it could not overtly explain all the money the Air Force was spending on its versions of the A-12. At the same time, some CIA and Pentagon officials recognized that crashes or sightings of test flights could compromise the project. With a turning radius of no less than 86 miles at full speed, the A-12 overflew a vast expanse of unrestricted territory. Soon after the first flights in April 1962, CIA and the Air Force changed the program’s cover story from involving an interceptor aircraft to a multipurpose satellite launch system.[1] In late 1962 and early 1963 the Department of Defense considered surfacing the YF-12A to provide a cover, reasoning that divulging the existence of a purely tactical aircraft would not reveal any clandestine collection capabilities. Voiced principally by CIA officials and James Killian and Edwin Land of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the contrary argument—disclosing any version of the A-12 would compromise its design innovations, enable the Soviets to develop countermeasures, and destroy its value for reconnaissance—prevailed for the time being. The surfacing issue lingered, however, because OXCART technology would be useful for the Air Force’s supersonic B-70 bomber then under development, and for the proposed commercial supersonic transport that Congress was thinking about subsidizing. President Kennedy told CIA and the Pentagon to develop a plan for surfacing the OXCART program but to wait further instructions before proceeding. By early 1964 the argument for disclosure had become persuasive. More A-12s were arriving at the test site and making more flights. The aircraft’s existence probably would be revealed eventually under circumstances the US government could not control, such as a training accident or equipment malfunction, or through a news leak. Commercial airline crews had sighted the A-12 in flight, and the editor of Aviation Week indicated that he knew about highly secret activities at the Skunk Works and would not let another publication scoop him. A key factor was that the Soviets’ TALL KING radar would be able to identify and track the A-12 despite its small, nonpersistent radar return. Finally, the White House’s reluctance to resume flights over Soviet territory would soon force a change in the A-12’s mission. Instead of flying over denied areas to collect strategic intelligence, it would most likely be used as a quick-reaction surveillance platform in fast-moving conflicts—a tactical function the Air Force should carry out, not