Ms. Fallsbauer has common authority over the apartment that is searched in this case. She is a third party. If a third party has common authority over a space, he can authorize a search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). Common authority is based on “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.” Illinois. v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). Ms. Fallsbauer is one of the tenants of the studio apartment she shares with her son. (R. at 5.) Mutual use of the property qualifies as they share the apartment. The control for “most purposes” is met because a studio apartment has a combined living, kitchen, and sleeping area. There are no separate bedrooms. This would give Ms. Fallsbauer control for most purposes within the apartment as there are not different private areas for the both of them. She is a tenant of the apartment located at 228 Elm Street. (R. at 5.) She may be a third party, but she can still consent to a search of the apartment she lives in because the standards for common authority have been met.…show more content… The consent of one who “possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). Common authority has already been established. Ms. Fallsbauer was present at the apartment. David Fallsbauer was not present at the apartment. Since he was not there but his mother was, it was perfectly acceptable for her to grant consent. She has control over the premises so her consent to the search is valid against the nonconsenting absent person, David, simply because he was not
