Cases Essay

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Pages: 35

1.Commonwealth v State of Tasmania 2. Lee v Knapp
In Lee v Knapp [1967] 2 QB 442 an Act required that a motorist "stop" after an accident. The defendant claimed that they did in fact momentarily halt, before proceeding, therefore complying with a commonly accepted literal meaning of "stop". The judge found that in this circumstance "stop" meant halt and wait for police or other officials to investigate the accident. A literal interpretation was against the purpose of the law.

3a Smith v Hughes

SMITH v HUGHES (1960) 1 WLR 830


These are six appeals by way of case stated by one of the stipendiary magistrates sitting at Bow Street, before whom informations
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In the other cases it was done by tapping on the windows of various rooms occupied by these prostitutes and then, if the window was open, giving invitations by way of solicitation or signals representing solicitation. In each case signals were intended to solicit men passing by in the street. They did effect solicitation of the men when they reached those men. At that moment the person in the street to whom the signal was addressed was solicited and, being solicited in the street, I agree with the conclusion of my Lord and for these reasons I have intimated that these appeals must be dismissed.


I agree with both the judgments which have been delivered.

Cases stated

These were appeals by Cases Stated from the adjudications of one of the magistrates of the police courts of the metropolis sitting at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court as a magistrates’ court, before whom informations were preferred on 27 November 1959, 8 December 1959, 5 January 1960 and on a day unknown in 1960 by the respondents, police officers, that the appellants, Marie Theresa Smith and Christine Tolan being common prostitutes, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.

There were two informations against Marie Theresa Smith, which were heard on 4 February 1960, when the following facts were found. The appellant was a common prostitute, living at 39, Curzon Street, W1, and using the