Joint Task Force-Iraq

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In 2014 when Canada deployed a Task Force to fight the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) became involved in the Coalition targeting process. Targeting is enabled by intelligence and works best when operations and intelligence are highly integrated. Collection planning to support target development is executed by operation staff, so the closer the link and understanding between intelligence and operations the more coherent the results. Further to this, there is also a relationship between analytical investment and collection requirements. The Joint Task Force - Iraq (JTF-I) National Intelligence Center (NIC) on Rotation 0 (ROTO 0) demonstrated that high quality Intelligence Preparation of …show more content…
A second order effect of the NIC’s target production was the Coalition asking Canada to lead missions with our CF18s based on targets developed by the NIC. The NIC developed targets using an Active Based Intelligence (ABI) approach and existing models to achieve efficiency in intelligence production. By leveraging relationships in the virtual and physical domain with other intelligence organizations and OGDs the NIC was able to produce high quality intelligence products that received recognition for our own Chief of Defence Staff and the Commander of the United States (U.S.) Central Command (CENTCOM). Canadian should be proud of the work done by the JTF-I NIC, as a Five Eyes Nation (FVEYs) we belong to a unique club and the NIC demonstrated that Canada is a valued …show more content…
Most people perceive that the Canadian Targeting effort is focused on our CF-18s or support to the CF-18s. Yet, Canada also deployed an intelligence organization, a National Intelligence Center with all source intelligence capabilities. The JTF-I NIC supported the deliberate targeting process by finding ISIS targets. Finding targets in Joint Targeting is the result of analysis not collection. Collection (ISR) is an input to the analytical process. The NIC focused on supporting the Joint Targeting process to enable deliberate targeting. For context most targets serviced in Iraq in 2014 and 2015 were combat engagements, with deliberate targeting being the exception. The process of target discovery, which enables Joint Targeting, is distinct from targets engaged in self-defence as part of an operations rules of engagement (ROE). ROE engagements are typically referred to as combat engagement in targeting parlance. Combat engagement is the norm at the tactical level, including most targets engaged as part of the Land targeting cycle. In the Joint Targeting process, collection inputs from the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) process are a contributing effort during target development. Target development collection requirements for ISR compete with other collection requirements including